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INTRODUCTION

Justice Holmes once said concerning Justice Brewer: "[a] very
pleasant man in private, but he had the itch for public speaking and writing and made me shudder many times." ' Today in America, there are
still many who would prefer that upon appointment, the Brethren of the
Robe 2 take a vow of public silence and communicate only through the
formal media of written opinions or official rulings from the bench. For
such traditionalists, the power of the judiciary lies in its separation from
earthly interchange. The transgression of public comment and debate
only denigrates judicial authority and independence by raising inferences of politics and prejudice. Such an appearance of mortality, it is
claimed, will diminish public trust by tearing down thejudiciary's image
of fairness and objectivity in an otherwise biased and self-interested
society.
Our complex world has put incredible pressures on the legal system. With increasing frequency, our courts are called upon to decide
issues of grave public importance. The demarcation between law and
policy has grayed and disintegrated with the rise of special interest politics. The once defined provinces of legislative and judicial responsibility
have merged into the more nebulous concept of the "public issue." Yet
despite the growing importance of the judicial role in public controversy, the legal system remains a mystery to many. The vast majority of
citizens have no ready source of information regarding the operation of
our courts. What few insights are available tend to be twisted by undue
simplicity, misunderstanding, and political posturing. Unlike many
other public officials, judges are constantly translating and explaining
the intricacies of the legal system. Due to their intimacy with the legal
process, judicial participation in public education would help to cool irrational fires, raise the level of debate, and assist in governmental reform by focusing attention on the truly relevant issues of the day.
The purpose of this article is to explore the legal, ethical, and policy
considerations regarding the public role of judges. It is my hope this
article will lead others to the conclusion that the benefits ofjudicial participation in education of the public far outweigh any illusory fears of
tainting judicial objectivity and disrupting the antiquated myth ofjudicial power. Here, the path of realism can only help us to grow and mature as citizens and free our judges to more easily satisfy the heavy
responsibilities we have placed upon them.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

JudicialIndependence and the Traditional View Towards the Role of Judges
Despite the particular means ofjudicial selection,3 it is clear judges

1. 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK L-rERS 160 (M. Howe
2. Throughout this article, male pronouns and
of convenience and are not intended to suggest the
3. See infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.

ed. 1961).
metaphors are used only as a matter
proper gender for a judge.
It should be noted that even elected
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must be free to make objective decisions based on a fair application of
the law to the specific facts before them. Thus, judicial independence
from political pressure is considered a crucial prerequisite to the proper
4
functioning of democratic government.
This notion ofjudicial independence is central to the traditionalist
argument against public expression by the judiciary. A most pristine
statement of this view was made by Dean Acheson:
Speeches and lectures by judges and Justices should be restricted to legal subjects (including eulogies of deceased jurists) and to legal audiences. The judiciary will only invite
trouble if it intrudes into other fields.
This practice [of participation in nonjudicial work or organizations] should be flatly prohibited. The most important extrajudicial assignments distract from judicial tasks, and lesser ones
may bring involvement in controversies detracting from judicial impartiality and aloofness.
I recommend a strong stand against the appointment of any
judge or Justice to political office within a given number of
years after his leaving a judicial office. When a man shuttles
back and forth between judicial and executive office, he does
curnot give the assurance of impartiality and aloofness from
5
rent issues that the judge's special position requires.
Without question, this strict theory ofjudicial sacrifice and respon6
sibility is sincerely held by many good and thoughtful individuals.
judges are substantially restrained in their political activities by the ABA MODEL CODE OF
Canon 7 (1972)[hereinafter CODE].
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (J. Madison)(C. Rossiter ed. 1961)("Were the executive magistrate, or the judges not independent of the legislature in the particular, their
independence in every other [department] would be merely nominal"); Kaufman, Chilling
Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 684 (1979)("Adjudication based on the noble precept 'equal justice under law' requires impartiality, and impartiality demands freedom
from political pressure"). For a more expansive discussion of the Anglo-American history
ofjudicial independence, see Ervin, Separation ofPowers:Judicial Independence, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 108 (1970).
5. Acheson, Removing the Shadow Cast on the Courts, 55 A.B.A.J. 919-20 (1969).
6. For example, Judge Abner Mikva follows the traditionalist approach to judicial
activity:
The arena in which policy decisions are made in no way can, or should, resemble the arena in which individual justice is distributed. Pejorative as it may
sound, the suggestion that judges go "out on the hustings" conjures up the image of the judge explaining his decision in the public square as the citizenry decides to put thumbs up or thumbs down.
Mikva, A Rejoinder to "The Judges Role in Educating the Public About the Law," 31 CATH. U.L.
REV. 209, 210-11 (1982) (footnotes omitted). See also Reavley, Free Speech forJudges, 9 LITIGATION 5 (Fall 1982). Justice Brennan has been severely criticized for his public comments
regarding Attorney General Meese:
While extramural pontificating may do the justices' psyche a world of good, it is
What
hardly helpful to the image - and the independence - of the court ....
gives the court its credibility and makes people pay attention to its rulings is its
reputation for independent judgment. The business of the court isn't politics as
usual but reasoned interpretation - principled interpretation - of the Constitution, free from tugs of partisanship. That's what has earned the justices their reJUDICIAL CONDUCT
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However, one wonders whether a judicial vow of silence is really necessary to preserve judicial independence.
B.

The Myth of Judicial Power

Perhaps the traditionalist approach is really a throwback to some
archaic notion regarding the myth ofjudicial superiority, authority, and
transcendental infallibility. Anyone who has spent any time in court cannot help but be impressed by the aura of ritualism that surrounds such
proceedings. The design of the typical courtroom induces a pyschological effect not unlike that of a church. High ceilings and subdued lighting
immediately impress the visitor with the message that he is now in an
important and sacred place. With this realization, the noisy haggling of
the street is left behind. Conversation becomes purposeful and conducted in hushed and respectful tones. Observers may not enter into
the well, but must, instead, take seats in the pews set aside for the laymen congregation. On the other, more hallowed, side of the bar, officers and participants take their predetermined places. All focus and
attention is on the sacrosanct and monolithic bench.
The proceedings begin with a call to order, the recitation of some
ancient words, and the processional of the black-robed judge from his
private entrance to the bench. Welcomes are given and the rite begins.
Witnesses are sworn and testimony considered. Texts are interpreted
and debated. Often, decisions are revealed only after secret and quiet
deliberation. 7 Thus, the entire ceremony hints of transcendental religiosity and the direct intervention of a higher authority. 8
Preservation of this imagery and illusion is based on a belief that
such ritualism 9 is necessary both to promote obedience to court decrees
spect. Once that perception of judicial independence goes, the Supreme Court
becomes fair game for all sorts of political marauding.
Kirp, Court Slips a Notch With Brennan's Slap at Meese, L.A. Times, Oct. 18, 1985, § II, at 5,
col. 4; Brennan Opposes Legal View Urged by Administration, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § A, at

1, col. 2.
7. The secrecy ofjudicial deliberations is a source of both mysticism and speculation.
As described in the context of the United States Supreme Court:
For those nearly two hundred years, the Court has made its decisions in absolute secrecy, handing down its judgments in formal written opinions. Only
these opinions, final and unreviewable, are published. No American institution

has so completely controlled the way it is viewed by the public. The Court's deliberative process - its internal debates, the tentative positions taken by the Justices, the preliminary votes, the various drafts of written opinions, the
negotiations, confrontations, and compromises - is hidden from public view.
The Court has developed certain traditions and rules, largely unwritten, that
are designed to preserve the secrecy of its deliberations. The few previous attempts to describe the Court's internal workings - biographies of particularJustices or histories of individual cases - have been published years, often decades,
after the events, or have reflected the viewpoints of only a few Justices.
B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 1 (1979). For a severe criticism of ThE
BRETHREN and the methods and perceptions of its authors, see Anastaplo, Legal Realism, the
NewJournalism, and The Brethren, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1045.
8. For an analysis of the element of transcendental religiosity which has been carried
along by the concept of natural law, see R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 76-83 (1976).
9. The formal decoration and decorum ofjudicial proceedings has also been likened
to theater and dramatic productions. See Ball, The Play's the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection
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and to perpetuate the myth of judicial power.' 0 The proponents and
defenders of the myth argue that the courts are responsible for the
moral legitimization and continuity of authority in our rule of law society. '1 In such a society, where there is no one homogeneous morality,
the courts must maintain the image that their decisions are the product
of a high moral authority. In order to cultivate this priest-like appearance, judges should speak only from the bench, refraining from public
expression that might raise doubt regarding the strength or infallibility
of the judgment. This illusion is required to put an end to disputes between warring parties and to give the appearance of teeth to judicial
decrees which, in reality, are dependent on the executive branch for
enforcement. 12
on Courts Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REV. 81 (1975). It has been argued that the
props and soliloquy of "judicial theater": 1) encourage impartiality and objectivity; 2) facilitate good judgments through live presentation and the communication of nonverbal
information; 3) induce creativity and imaginative alternatives; 4) redirect aggression; and
5) maintain a sense of fairness apart from the rest of the world. Id. at 100-08. Through its
reenactment of events and presentation of illusion and conflicting viewpoints, the trial has
the potential to provide a deeper truth than might otherwise be possible. Id. at 91-92.
However, deviation from the classic trial/theater metaphor results in the invalidation of
the proceedings. In Roberts v. State, 100 Neb. 199, 158 N.W. 930 (1916), the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that crossing the line between judicial theater and dramatic theater
was inappropriate.
The court removed the trial from the courtroom to the theater, and stated as
a reason therefor:
"By reason of the insufficiency of the courtroom to seat and accommodate
the people applying for admission . . . it is by the court ordered that the further
trial of this cause be had at the Keith Theater, and thereupon the court was adjourned to Keith Theater, where trial proceeded."
The stage was occupied by court, counsel, jury, witnesses, and officers connected with the trial. The theater proper was crowded with curious spectators.
Before the trial was completed it was returned to the courtroom and concluded
there. At the adjournment of court on one occasion the bailiff announced from
the stage: "The regular show will be to-morrow(sic); matinee in the afternoon
and another performance at 8:30. Court is now adjourned until 7:30."
Id. at 203; 158 N.W. at 931-32.
10. As one commentator has observed:
Judges embody the law. If the law is august, majestic, mysterious, impersonal, objective, above party or ideology, and immune to fear or favor, ourjudges
must be the same. On the bench, we cloak them in black, raise them above litigants and lawyers, and equate them with the court itself. Off the bench, the
judges are anonymous, and some critics would cloister them in a social, economic, and professional monastery, allowing them to talk only to other lawyers or
perhaps only to other judges.
Tucker, The Judges Role in Educating the Public About the Law, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 201, 203
(1982).
11. As such, we have imbibed our judicial system with an image of immortality. Unlike the legislative and executive branches, the courts and the rule of law do not change
from term to term. Instead, a change in membership does not affect the life or nature of
the institution which, itself, exists in perpetuity. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 30-33 (1962).
12. The school integration decisions of the 1950's and 1960's provide a good example
regarding the enforcement ofjudicial decrees. After the initial decision in Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), there was some minor compliance, but the majority of
school districts ignored the Court's ruling and prepared to stall or impede its effect. By
doing so, these political entities stretched the authority of the courts to the near breaking
point and demonstrated that the assumed power was, by itself, simply a myth. It was only
after the power of the executive branch was brought to bear that Brown and integration
became the law of the land. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 244-72. ChiefJustice Earl Warren
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Modernity and the Expanding Role of Judges

Although there may be a comfortable logic in the traditionalist approach, one tends to wonder whether our acceptance of this approach is
based on real necessity or upon our traditional training as lawyers and
citizens, complete with its built-in assumptions and biases.13
Despite the influence of our ancestral teachings, there is substantial
room to argue that our customary perceptions ofjudicial authority not
only insult our maturity as citizens, but are simply inappropriate for our
complex, rapidly changing society and for the new roles the courts have
been called upon to play.' 4 The United States is a rule of law system
and our laws represent an attempt to establish a common denominator
for a vastly heterogeneous society. In other words, all that James
Madison's conflicting factions and special interest groups 15 may have in
common is a relatively uniform system of laws and the procedural means
16
to enforce those norms of behavior.
Throughout American history, our courts have been called upon to
decide "symbolic"' 7 questions that, because of their highly politicized
18
and controversial nature, were not subject to legislative resolution.
However, with the rise of modem America and the pervasive growth of
the regulatory state, 19 citizens have increasingly turned to the courts for
answers to the most fundamental and far-reaching issues of government
and social policy. Failure of other governmental institutions to meet the
problems of the day, 20 has caused the judicial branch to become an "acused his own authority on the Court to achieve a unanimous vote. By speaking with one
unified voice, the Court attempted to negate any doubt concerning its resolve regarding
the issue. H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 331-32 (4th ed. 1982).
13. J. FRANK, LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY 259-61 (1963). More than fifty years ago,
Jerome Frank commented on the image of the judiciary as a father figure:
Men in any of life's relations will never be completely free of delusions. But
delusions can be diminished. And those who desire the healthy growth of the law
will with courage seek to diminish legal delusions and, to that end, to comprehend the nature and sources of their own weaknesses, and of the powerful yearning in themselves as well as others for unrealities in law....
A coming-of-age has its perils for the children and its pains for the parents.
Yet if our legal critics are to play the role of wise fathers, they must have the
courage to let their "children" grow up....
Growing up means throwing off dependence upon external authority. It
means self-reliance, the acceptance of responsibility. It means questioning-not
hastily, angrily, rebelliously, but calmly and dispassionately--our bequests from
the past, our social heritage.
Id.
14. Tucker, supra note 10, at 203.
15. As defined by Madison:
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (J. Madison)(C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
16. Id. at 77-84.
17. See Downing, Judicial Ethics and the Political Role of the Courts, 35 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 94, 101 (1970).

18. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); D. FEHRENBACHER,
(1978).
19. See Kaufman, supra note 4, at 686-89.
20. See Downing, supra note 17, at 97.

THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
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celerator of governmental activity. '"21 It has been attributed with defacto
responsibility for critical policy issues such as racial integration, legislative apportionment, abortion, religious exercise and establishment, obscenity, unpopular wars, unethical presidents, the rights of the
criminally insane, and the protection of the environment.
D.

The Need for Public Knowledge of the Legal System

Judicial consideration of policy issues has brought the courts to the
forefront of public controversy and criticism. Questions of such societal
importance are inherently nebulous and not subject to clear-cut determination. In addition, the conflict surrounding judicial resolution of social issues is enhanced by the fact that such questions often lie at the
heart of one issue or special interest politics.

22

In reaction to the tur-

moil of our modern world, citizens are demanding that courts provide
simple answers to complex problems. As a result, where a legal/policy
question is the only agenda item of two "right thinking" political
groups, dissatisfaction and outrage will necessarily follow any judicial
decision. While a loss of public confidence in the courts may actually
23
represent a diffused feeling of frustration with the overall legal system,
the new policymaking role of the judiciary has made it a focal point of
social and governmental controversy. The contemporary function and
character of our judicial system therefore magnifies the importance of
the question with which I began: should our judges respond to public
criticism and conjecture with isolation and silence or with openness, explanation and education?
Our law, like the society from which it is derived, is large and complex. Its nuances, fictions and methods may not be readily understandable by those who have not dedicated vast amounts of time and energy to
legal study and thought. Thus, to a large number of citizens, the law
may appear to be a secret and suspect system within the exclusive control of a select elite. 24 However, considering the interrelation of public
21. Kaufman, supra note 4. at 685.
22. The rise of special interest politics is really a creature of the Twentieth Century.
See A. KELLY, W. HARBISON, & H. BELZ, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 662-81, 731-39 (6th ed. 1983)[hereinafter THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION].

[Als society fragments into discrete groups unchecked by any overarching consensus - or at least any consensus that can be translated into coherent public
policy - there is likely to be increased reliance on the forms and institutions of
law. The litigation explosion of the 1970's appears to bear this out. In absence
of shared community values, however, the motive force behind the proliferating
legal action - and behind the continuing judicial and administrative lawmaking
which it engenders - is political expediency and ideology. . . . [I]f the trend
toward ideologically based single-issue politics continues, it will threaten the bal-

ance between law and politics that has been the essential condition of constitutional government in the United States.
Id. at 739.
23. Miller, Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some ,Votes and Reflections, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 70 (1970); see also THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 22, at 683-

702.
24. The controversy and interest surrounding the publication of B. WOODWARD & S.
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979) tends to support the proposition that "there is a vast
public hunger for knowledge about the legal system." Tucker, supra note 10, at 203.
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and legal controversies, the de facto segregation of legal knowledge is
incongruent with democratic theory and process. The public's ignorance of the substance and workings of the law can give rise to a number
of undesirable effects. First, as to the well-intentioned but ill-informed
citizen, a lack of legal knowledge may cause him to chart the course of
his activities far away from the actual demarcation between allowed and
prohibited behavior. The result of such ignorance is an unwarranted
loss of potential freedom and choice. Secondly, public ignorance gives
great power to those who do know the law and elevates them to the
status of moral priests in a rule of law society. The result can be an
unnecessary relinquishment of power which rightfully belongs to the
people. Finally, the public's ignorance of the law can cause misunderstandings concerning the legal process and the subtleties of its application to public and private controversies. Such misunderstandings lead
to frustration and disillusionment, resulting in legal evolution based on
emotional reaction rather than rational, informed, and objective
deliberation.
Because of the importance of law in modern society, the public
needs reliable and understandable sources of information concerning
our legal system. Without such information, the public cannot accurately scrutinize the legal process and correct its abuses. Unfortunately,
many citizens possess simplistic insights into the workings of our legal
system. Therefore, if we are to bring the public back into democratic
lawmaking, someone should be responsible for continuing public legal
education.
E.

Who Should Educate the Public?

There are several potential sources from which the public can receive information regarding the workings of the legal process. For example, elected officials, the practicing bar, and the press can do much to
interpret and explain the legal process. However, each group suffers
from deficiencies of motivation and/or knowledge which make reliance
on any or all of them inadequate to achieve the goals of public
education.
Elected officials, whether they be part of the executive or legislative
branches, by the nature of their positions, are in constant contact with
their constituents. As such, they would seem to be an excellent source
of public information and insight into the legal process. The political
realities of achieving and retaining office, however, make it unlikely that
elected officials can be relied upon to speak the whole truth during a
public controversy. Instead, there may be a tendency to avoid unpopular viewpoints and cloud the real focus of responsibility since total disclosure would be politically unproductive.
The practicing bar has both the education and experience to contribute much to public understanding of the legal system. In fact, the
bar, at both local and national levels, has sponsored events and forums

JUDICIAL ETHICS

1988]

for public education. 2 5 The scope of such endeavors, however, has been
far from adequate. This may be attributed to the reluctance of the profession, for both class and economic reasons, to give away too much of
what gives it its mystery and social position. 26 The shortcomings of the
bar are perpetuated by a separate legal language that serves as a barrier
to exclude the public from legal comprehension.
Journalists, although not motivated by political or professional protectionism, may be inadequate decipherers of legal minutiae because of
both a lack of legal sophistication and the inherent differences of perception imposed by newsgathering methods. Certainly, the media are
an invaluable part of our democracy. Throughout our history,2 7 the
press has informed citizens about the workings of American government. However, the generalist orientation of journalists tends to be
much more effective in the expansive arena of politics and public opinion than in the more technical territory of lawmaking and its application. 2 8 Although both the law and journalism have the common goal of
truthseeking, journalists are concerned with all facts surrounding a
given event, while the legal process is only concerned with those facts
which are relevant to the claims that have been made. Therefore, because of their different orientation and lack of sophisticated legal understanding, journalists tend to focus on the "living" aspects of a legal
dispute, thereby subjecting their profession to charges of sensationalism
by judges and the bar.2 9 As a result, the media may be able to answer
the basic "who, why, when, where, and how" but not the more subtle
and technical issues that are at the heart of a legal controversy. Unfortu25.

See Id.

26. Id. For an analogous argument regarding the development of the medical profession, see generally, P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).
It is arguable that, for these same reasons, the bar has supported and perpetuated judicial
isolation in order to maintain its position as the only group which is sanctioned to communicate with the judiciary. Tucker, supra note 10, at 203.
27. During the last thirty years, the gentlemanly days of informal press/government
liaisons came to an end. Instead, the sly winks and private meetings between press and

party gave way to a full-fledged adversary relationship. See E. EMERY & M.

EMERY,

THE

PRESS AND AMERICA 541-85 (5th ed. 1984). The first hints of the potential and direction of

the modern press began with the rise of objective reporting during the McCarthy era. See
A. SMITH, GOODBYE GUTENBERG: THE NEWSPAPER REVOLUTION OF THE 1980s 170 (1980).

However, the period of conflict between media and government had its true beginnings
during the Vietnam War where new technology brought the faces of dead and dying American soldiers into the living room and contributed to popular reaction against a previously
unchallenged foreign policy. Mandelbaum, Vietnam: The Television War, 3 DAEDALUS 157
(Fall 1982). Likewise, Watergate further demonstrated the power and attitude of the modern press and resulted in the resignation of an American president and the creation of a
political crisis of confidence. See C. BERNSTEIN & B. WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN
(1975). Most recently, an "invisible journalistic threshold" was crossed when a reporter
from the Washington Post asked Gary Hart, "Have you ever committed adultery?" Alter,
Character Cops on Patrol, NEWSWEEK May 18, 1987, at 26.
28. For example, the "process of inclusion and exclusion in journalism.., is markedly
different from the process of inclusion and exclusion in the law." L. DENNISTON, THE

(1980).
29. Id. at 51. This difference in perspective can be seen by comparing an appellate
docket with the decisions the press has seen as sufficiently significant to report. For example, if the docket contains two cases, one involving a formalistic appeal from a death sentence that is without legal merit, and another challenging a common law rule such as the
REPORTER AND THE LAW: TECHNIQUES OF COVERING THE COURTS 5
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nately, these technical issues must be understood before the public can
determine whether a fair decision has been made or an adequate policy
adopted.
Judges, on the other hand, do not suffer from the infirmities of the
other groups examined, thereby rendering them the best source available to the public for thoughtful insights into the legal process. Depending on their method of appointment, judges are generally free from
the types of financial or political interests which might discourage candor. By the very nature of their positions, judges are perceived as decision-makers and carry an aura of authority. These factors would allow
judges to take an active role in the education of the public, while still
maintaining public respect for the bench and its official decisions.
Perhaps most importantly, their career experiences as both attorneys and jurists provide judges with the insight necessary to adequately
explain the practical and conceptual workings of the law. Judges constantly observe the operation of the legal process and are well qualified
to discuss the successes and failures of the law as well as answer questions posed by the public.3 0 Through participation in public comment,
judges could point out the weaknesses and strengths thereby contributing to the overall performance of the system.
This is not to say that judges would be entirely free to make public
comments without legal or ethical constraints. Successful fulfillment of
judicial responsibility requires conscious prudence in order to preserve
independence, impartiality and public confidence. However, as the following discussion demonstrates, the maintenance of judicial integrity
does not require an all-encompassing vow of silence. Instead of such
formalistic prohibitions, the judiciary need merely contemplate whether
the specific type of public participation in question can be approached
without harm to the proper functioning of the legal system as a whole.
negligence doctrine of tender years, the press will be inclined to cover the more sensational death penalty while not recognizing the importance of the latter, more subtle, issue.
One commentator has described the differences between legal and journalistic perceptions as follows:
The journalist tells his story by moving from the most significant to the least.
The lawyer often builds his case the other way around.
The journalist hopes for immediate impact with his audiences - and usually
can expect it. The lawyer works toward a contemplative judgment from the
courts - often, much later.
The journalist pursues the novel. The lawyer searches for the familiar.
The journalist is fascinated by the illogical. The lawyer reduces events and
emotions to logic.
Obviously, then, when the journalist undertakes to cover the law and write
about it, the potential for division and misunderstanding between reporter and

sources is quite large.
Id. at 6-7.
30. Judges can also offer great insight into the more conceptual workings of the legal
process such as the effect of precedent, the role of the judiciary in reviewing legislative
acts, and what it really means to say that a particular judge is conservative or liberal. See
Shetreet, On Assessing the Role of Courts in Society, 10 MANITOBA L.J. 357, 375-88 (1980).
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III.

THE ETHICAL BOUNDARIES OF JUDICIAL COMMENT

A. Judicial Taxonomy
Before analyzing the legal and ethical boundaries of public expression by judges, it should be noted that there are different types of
judges. Each jurisdiction has different categories ofjudges and different
methods by which judges acquire their positions. 3' The law of the particular jurisdiction determines how a judge is appointed, 3 2 under what
circumstances he may be disciplined or removed,"3 and the force of the
various ethical standards and codes which may be applied to judicial activities. 34 Therefore, it is difficult to generalize concerning the legal restraints upon public judicial expression.
Likewise, as a policy consideration, the method by which a judge
achieves office may be an important factor in determining the bounds of
properjudicial behavior. For example, it would be difficult to argue that
a judge running for judicial office against a political opponent should
refrain from all public comment.3 5 On the other hand, appointed
judges, who may never be subject to review by the electorate, are secure
in their positions and have little reason to publicly account for their actions. Due to the independence of such life tenure judges, policy considerations that favor their participation in public debate and education
apply equally or with greater force to judges subject to election or
36
retention.
An examination of the legal and ethical propriety of public statements by federal judges provides a useful model which can easily be
applied to similar activities by judges of different jurisdictions. First,
federal Article III judges represent the highest degree of judicial independence in that they are part of a separate constitutional branch of
government, appointed for life and only subject to removal by impeachment as provided in Articles II and III of the United States Constitution. 3 7 Second, the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial
31. Wheeler & Levin, Judicial Discipline and Removal in the United States, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER STAFF PAPER 7-9 (1979).
32. Id. at 14-28; see generally, Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct and How Four States Deal

With It, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (1970)(discusses how NewJersey, California, Illinois, and New York treat judicial misconduct).
33. Braithwaite, supra note 32.
34. See Wheeler & Levin, supra note 31, at 49; Bray, The Problem of Sanctions, 19 UNIVERsITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL ETHICS 42 (1964); Martineau, Enforcement of the Code ofJudicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 410, 412-15.

35. See Comment, First Amendment Rights of Attorneys andJudges in Judicial Election Cam-

paigns, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 201 (1986).
36. As one commentator has argued:
Elected judges have a special responsibility to explain their decisions. An
elective system presupposes that what a judge does is worthy of public judgment.
The political impact of judicial decisions is an accepted factor in their decisionmaking. By educating citizens about their decisions, elected judges do not leave
the total responsibility to others like the press and their opponents.
Tucker, supra note 10, at 207.
37. See N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT 208 (1973); Miller, supra
note 23, at 71; Kaufman, supra note 4, at 681.
Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he Judges,
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Conduct, which has been adopted as the ethical standard for federal
judges, also governs the ethical conduct of judges in at least forty-four
states.3 8 Third, despite the various laws and ethical standards which
may be applied in different jurisdictions, the policy implications of public comments by judges remain relatively constant.
B.

The Code of Judicial Conduct

The crisis of public confidence which infected the United States in
the late 1960's and early 1970's brought virtually all of our governmental institutions under a shadow of suspicion.3 9 The national scandal that
resulted in the resignation of Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas 40 created a great deal of confusion among the judiciary and prompted a reformulation of judicial ethics and behavior. 4' As Dean McKay
explained, "[t]he ethical expectations of the public have risen even more
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour .... " This language creates a problem of interpretation in that Article III neither
defines "good behaviour" nor prescribes a procedure for the determination of a breach of
such behavior. It is generally assumed that this gap is filled by U.S. CONST. art II, § 4,
which reads: "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States,
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery,
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Some commentators argue that the "good behavior" language implies that "the standard imposed by the Constitution on federal
judges is higher than that constitutionally demanded of other civil officers," and should be
enforceable by procedures other than impeachment. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 49 n.5 (1978). See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 130
(1973); Shipley, Legislative Control ofJudicialBehavior, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 178, 182
(1970).
Nevertheless, the practical fact of the matter, supported by 200 years of history, is that
impeachment is the only official method by which to discipline or remove an Article III
judge. See Kaufman, supra note 4, passim. See also R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS:
COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC (1971).
The United States Supreme Court cast some doubt on the exclusivity of impeachment
as a method to remove judges in Chandler v.Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1970), where it
sidestepped the issue of whether the Judicial Council of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit could refuse to assign cases to one of its memberjudges. This
slight did not go unnoticed in the dissenting opinions by Justices Douglas and Black who
argued that a judge possessed the same first amendment rights as any ordinary citizen and
that the court's action represented a great insult to judicial independence. Id. at 129
(Douglas,J., dissenting); Id. at 141 (Black, J., dissenting). Although Chandler remains as a
source of speculation, it has not served as precedent for any further limiting actions.
38. The ABA Model Code ofJudicial Conduct has been adopted in full by 44 states.
Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Rhode Island. and Wisconsin have established
separate codes ofjudicial conduct or ethics which do not conform to the Code. Memorandum, Ref. No. RIS 84.032, National Center for State Courts (1984). For a detailed breakdown of the various state codes, see D. FRETZ, R. PEEPLES & T. WICKER, ETHICS FOR JUDGES
6 (1982).
39. See Downing, supra note 17, at 94-95.
40. Justice Fortas was the heir apparent to Chief Justice Earl Warren's seat when it
was discovered that he had secretly been receiving $20,000 a year from a private foundation. Edwards, Commentary on Judicial Ethics, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 259, 259-60 (1969-70).
The surrounding controversy also involved an attempt to impeachJustice William Douglas
and caused Justice William Brennan to give up his position as head of the Appellate
Judge's Seminar at New York University Law School. See Tucker, supra, note 10, at 204 n.
4-6.
41. See generally, Hearings on Nonjudicial Activities of Supreme Court Judges and Other Federal
Judges, before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. (1969).
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rapidly than have the perceptions of the judges of what is now expected
42
of them."
In 1969, the American Bar Association began a three year effort
which resulted in the adoption of the Code of Judicial Conduct in
1972. 4 3 The drafters of the Code intended that its provisions be made
mandatory and given the force of law. 44 A number of the states that
have adopted the Code have followed this intent and use the Code as a
standard for the discipline of state judges. 4 5 However, when applied to
federal judges, the Code has never been considered legally binding.
At the same time the American Bar Association was writing the
Code of Judicial Conduct, the Interim Advisory Committee on Judicial
Activities was created by Chief Justice Warren Burger to provide advi46
sory opinions to federal judges seeking direction on ethical matters.
The Advisory Committee on Judicial Activities, however, does not have
the authority to make decisions which carry the force of law. 4 7 As stated
at the end of each letter opinion: "The Committee's function is solely
advisory. The final decision in any ethical situation must remain the responsibility of the individual judicial officer."' 48 With this background in
mind, it is appropriate to examine those provisions of the Code most
relevant to an analysis of public judicial expression.
C.

The FoundationalPrinciples: Independence, Avoidance of Impropriety,
and Impartiality

The foundational principles underlying the guidelines of the Code
can best be stated as independence, impartiality, and the avoidance of
42. McKay, TheJudiciary and NAonJudicialActivities, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1970).
43. The Code replaced the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which were adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1924. The new Code is structured to be subject to
mandatory application and is thus distinguished from the original Canons, which were
'characterized by moral posturing and generalized exhortation." Lubet, Participation by
Judges in Civic and Charitable Activities: H'hat are the Limits? 69 JUDICATURE 68, 69 (Aug.-Sept.
1985)(footnote omitted).
44. E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 43 (1973). See also
Kaufman, Lions orJackals: The Function ofa Code ofJudicialEthics, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

3, 6 (1970)(a proper code of ethics "must aim at prompting a dialogue between a judge's
own ethical sense and generally recognized communal moral standards").
45. Martineau, supra note 34, passim.

46. See Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Preface.
The first 26 opinions of the Interim Advisory Committee on Judicial Activities were published prior to the adoption of the Code of Judicial Conduct by the
Judicial Conference of the United States. Following the approval of the Code the
name of the Interim Advisory Committee was changed to the "Advisory Committee on Judicial Activities." The advisory opinions beginning with Advisory Opinion No. 27 have been issued following the adoption of the Code of Judicial
Conduct for United States Judges.
ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES FOR UNITED STATES 11-63 (1973).

47. See Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Preface.
48. Any attempt to give such force of law to the Code as to federal judges would raise
substantial statutory and constitutional problems. See generally Ervin, supra note 4 (dis-

cusses historical basis forjudicial independence); Holloman, The JudicialReform Act: Histor,
Analysis, and Comment, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 128 (1970)(general discussion of the
Judicial Reform Act).
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the appearance of impropriety. All other rules revolve around these
three principles, as do the ethical and policy considerations regarding
the effect of public expression by judges. The variety of public statements which may trigger ethical scrutiny are not all easily defined or
subject to clear categorization. The types of public statements which
could be made by judges are innumerable and carry with them a variety
of distinct as well as subtle implications. In order to understand the
categories of public activities and expression in which judges should be
encouraged to engage, it is important to analyze these basic principles of
the Code as well as those canons which more directly address the
49
problem.
1.

Canon One - Judicial Integrity and Independence

Canon 1 of the Code admonishes: "A Judge Should Uphold The
Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary. ' '5 0 This has been interpreted to include both the independence of the judiciary as a branch of
government and the independence of the individual judge. As stated by
Justice Black in Chandler v. Judicial Council:
One of the great advances made in the structure of government by our Constitution was its provision for an independent
judiciary-for judges who could do their duty as they saw it
without having to account to superior court judges or to any51
one else except the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment.
It has even been argued that in order to preserve judicial independence, the American Bar Association should have had no part in the
52
drafting of the Code.
2.

Canon Two -

Impropriety

Canon 2 states: "A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities."15 3 Included in this pro49. See infra notes 82-126 and accompanying text.

50. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 1. Canon 1 reads as follows:
A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing,
and should himself observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and
independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code
should be construed and applied to further that objective.
Id. This language is meant to clarify "that if ajudge is aware of a need for new or changed
standards, he has an obligation to work toward their establishment." E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 47 (1973).
51. 382 U.S. 1003, 1005-06 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
52. See Miller, supra note 23, at 71. Contra Ainsworth,Judicial Ethics - The FederalJudiciary Seeks Modern Standards of Conduct, 45 NOTRE DAME LAw 470 (1970) (standards should be
set by judges themselves with the help of the bar, especially the ABA).
53. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 2. Canon 2 reads:
A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His
Activities
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself
at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
B. Ajudge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to influence
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scription is the warning that a judge will be "the subject of constant
public scrutiny" 54 and must therefore accept restrictions on his conduct
not suffered by "ordinary citizen[s]. "' 5 5 The real thrust of the rule, howbe prostituted" by
ever, seems to be that the "judicial office should not
56
activities.
unofficial
in
prestige
judge's
a
of
the use
3.

Canon Three
a. Impartiality and Diligence

Official activity and comment is governed by Canon 3, one of the
more detailed and specific canons in the Code. The rule admonishes a
judge to "Perform the Duties of His Office Impartially and Diligently."' 5 7 In achieving this goal, "[a] judge should be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence in it, ' 5 8 avoid ex parte communication concerning a pending matter, 59 and "abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court."'60 In
a judge in
addition, the canon sets forth the standards to be applied 6by
1
considering his own disqualification from a given matter.
To be fully understood, Canon 3 must be interpreted in light of its
main focus, regulation of purely official judicial activities.62 Interpreting
Canon 3 with this in mind indicates that the canon's restraints are not
nearly as far reaching as might be assumed from first reading. For example, the requirement that judges "maintain professional competence
in [the law]" 63 does not operate to restrict judicial activities. Rather, it
encourages judicial expression in the form of writing and public speakhis judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor should he convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence him. He should not testify voluntarily as a character witness.
Id.
54. Id. at Canon 2, Commentary.
55. Id.
56. E. THODE, supra note 50, at 49.
57. See CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3.
58. Id. at Canon 3(A)(1).
59. Id. at Canon 3(A)(4). This portion of Canon 3 provides:
A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding,
or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by
law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a
pending or impending proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a
disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before him if he gives
notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and
affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond.
Id. Included in this prohibition is outside consultation with experts in a particular area of
law including other lawyers and law professors. Id. at Canon 3(A)(4), Commentary; E.
THODE, supra note 50, at 52-54.
60. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3(A)(6). This portion of Canon 3 provides:
A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court, and should require similar abstention on the part of court
personnel subject to his direction and control. This subsection does not prohibit
judges from making public statements in the course of their official duties or from
explaining for public information the procedures of the court.
61. See Id. at Canon 3(C).
62. See E. THODE, supra note 50, at 50.
63. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3(A)l).
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ing. Such involvement in human debate and interchange can only help
to bring a judge in touch with the world and the issues of the day, thus
improving his insight into matters brought before him in his official
capacity.
b.

Ex Parte Communications

The Canon's restrictions on ex parte communications and comments
regarding pending proceedings present a separate set of barriers, which,
when dissected, can be substantially limited to the purpose intended by
the canon. As to ex parte communications, any analysis must focus on
' 64
whether the situation involves "a pending or impending proceeding."
Although the Canon prohibits ex parte and other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding, it would seem to allow ex
65
parte and other communications for purposes of general consultation.
Further, the Canon allows a judge to seek out an expert for advice on an
issue pending before him if the requisite notice is given. This simple
requirement does not prohibit a judge from generally consulting with
experts who can advise him as to developments in the law or in regard to
problems which are continually being brought before the court. Such
an interpretation embodies the basic goal of judicial competence and
growth.
c.

Public Comment

The Canon's prohibition against "public comment about a pending
or impending proceeding in any court' ' 66 must be interpreted in light of
the entire subsection which explicitly states that judges are not prohibited "from making public statements in the course of their official duties
or from explaining for public information the procedures of the
court."' 6 7 Certainly, it is important to ensure the fundamental fairness

of an official proceeding and prevent it from being tried in the streets or
by the press. 68 This does not mean, though, that a judge should be the
martyr for the entire legal system. The canon seems to allow a judge to
point out, for example, that the reason a suspected criminal was released
was because the district attorney refused to prosecute the case or because the police conducted an illegal search. By explaining the rationale
for a particular disposition, a judge will not only protect the public im64. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3(A)(4).
65. Dalton, Off the Bench and Into the Mire: Judging Extrajudicial Behavior, 91 YALE L.J.
1708, 1720 (1982). Most recently, this problem has arisen due to revelations regarding
the off bench relationship between Justice Brandeis and, then, Professor Felix Frankfurter.
See B. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION (1982). For discussion and criticism of Murphy's thesis, see Book Review, The Extra-JudicialActivities of Supreme CourtJustices:
lhere Should the Line be Drawn? 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 494 (1983)
66. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3(A)(6).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Statements in this category
possess the inherent danger of effecting the outcome of the specific case from which they
are derived and the quality ofjustice which is dispensed to the particular parties before the
court.
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age of the judiciary, but also focus public attention on those officials
responsible. The rationale of the Canon, however, should be carried
one step further, allowing a judge, once a matter is no longer pending,
to accept the obligation of explaining his decision so that the winners,
the losers, and the general public have a chance to understand and see
that justice was done.
d.

Disqualification Standards

Finally, Canon 3's disqualification standards 69 must be closely examined to determine if ajudge's public expression regarding an issue of
law or public policy would require him to decline from hearing a case
raising that issue. The relevant part states:
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which
his impartialitymight reasonably be questioned, including but not
limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts
70
concerning the proceeding;
The emphasized language of the Canon provides the key to its application in the problem at hand. First, the general "impartiality"
benchmark sets the tone for this section and is to be employed in situations where a judge's conduct raises a reasonable question concerning
his ability to render a fair decision in a given matter. 7 1However, the
"personal bias or prejudice" standard provides the true insight into the
intent of the drafters. 72 The Committee explicitly rejected the notion
that ajudge should disqualify himself because of a fixed belief regarding
a legal issue. 7 3 Thus, this rule, which is virtually identical to the statutory provision for the disqualification of federal judges, 74 is, with rare
69. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3(C).
70. Id. at Canon 3(C)(l)(a) (emphasis added).
71. See E. THODE, supra note 50, at 60-61.
72. Canon 3(C) is primarily concerned with the type of bias that can result from family
relationships, former legal practice, and business dealings. Id. See Advisory Committee on
Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 62 (1979)(discusses in detail the types of problems and
situations that fall under Canon 3(C)).
73. As the Reporter noted:
Subsection (a) has gone through several formulations in drafting. At one
time the language provided for disqualification if ajudge "had a fixed belief concerning the merits." . . . The Committee was confronted, however, by the interpretation of many able judges and law professors that would require a judge to
disqualify himself if he had a fixed belief about the law applicable to a given case.
For example, it was argued that a judge with a fixed belief that the First Amendment precludes a libel action by a public official against a newspaper in the absence of proof of malice should disqualify himself in a libel case of that general
character. This interpretation was not intended; indeed, the Committee recognized the necessity and the value of judges' having fixed beliefs about constitutional principles and many other facets of the law. As a result of the apparent
ambiguity of the proposed language, the Committee adopted instead the standard of "personal bias or prejudice."
E. THODE, supra note 50, at 61.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. 1986) was modeled after Canon 3(C) of the Code. See
13(a) WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3549, at 612
(1984)[hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE]. In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982) states in part:
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exceptions, 75 not applicable to the types of comments a judge might
make in attempting to educate the public.
Given their narrowest interpretation, Canons 1, 2, and 3 could be
interpreted to prohibit any comment by a judge other than through a
written opinion or oral decision. A more liberal interpretation does not
support this conclusion. The policies behind Canons 1, 2, and 3 are
concerned with maintaining public trust and confidence in the judiciary.
In order to perpetuate and nurture such confidence, the public must
believe that judicial decisions are made impartially and are not based on
private favors or alliances. 76 It is, however, not clear that this public
confidence will be eroded through thoughtful judicial expression concerning the law. Certainly, it is better for the public to hear judicial
thoughts, both to identify any bias that may exist as well as to learn
something about our legal process. By fostering and encouraging such
expression, respect and public confidence in the judiciary will certainly
increase.
There is little merit in the argument that public expression of attitudes and opinions will detract from a judge's impartiality. According to
Judge Kaufman: "If such were the standard, few judges would be able
to adjudicate any controversies. Revelation of a judge's position in a
speech differs little from adoption of a stance in a prior judicial opinion."' 7 7 In addition, it is possible that by expressing an opinion a judge
may become more aware of his own biases and be better able to comWhenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely
and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a
personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party,
such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned
to hear such proceeding.
These provisions have been interpreted in line with Canon 3(C) and are not intended to
apply to fixed beliefs regarding legal and policy issues. See FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra, at

§ 3542, at 568 n.19 and decisions collected therein.
In light of the above discussion concerning Article III, see supra note 37, it would appear that in order for a judge to be subject to discipline and/or impeachment, he would
have to commit a statutorily defined criminal offense. The only two federal statutes relevant to this discussion concerning public judicial comment are the general disqualification
statutes. It is highly doubtful that violation of the disqualification statutes would amount
to the type of "crime" which could subject a judge to impeachment. The restraints embodied in the statutes are, in the first instance, self-imposed, to be backed up by appellate
review. In addition, in order for the disqualification statutes, or any of the similarly vague
provisions of the Judicial Code to carry criminal sanctions and to pass the specificity requirements of due process, they would have to more narrowly and precisely describe the
evil which was to be proscribed. See PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAw 4 (2d ed. 1969). But see
Clark,JudicialSelf-Regulation - Its Potential, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 42 (1970)(au-

thor suggests that it would be possible to give the Code the effect of criminal sanction).
75. It is possible that a personal bias regarding a distinct group could rise to the level
of discrimination and justify disqualification. See Note, Civil Procedure-Judicial Disqualification - Extra-JudicialAssociations and the Appearance-of-Preudice Test of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) Idaho v. Freeman, 31 KAN. L. REV. 200 (1982) (argues that a federal judge, who was also a
leader in the Mormon Church, should have disqualified himself from considering a case
regarding the Equal Rights Amendment); Lubet, Judicial Ethics and Private Lives, 79 Nw.
U.L. REv. 983, 999-1004 (1984-85) (judge subjected to disciplinary proceedings for making a racial remark in a news story).
76. See Lubet, supra note 75, at 985-90.
77. KaufmanJudges Must Speak Out, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1982, at 23, col. I.
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pensate for them while acting in his official capacity. Judges are trained
to repress their personal opinions when making official decisions. The
judicial method requires that judges decide cases on the merits after applying the law to a given set of facts. Public expression of a general legal
opinion should not detract from this process. 7 8 As observed by Justice
Cardozo:
The training of the judge, if coupled with what is styled the
judicial temperament, will help in some degree to emancipate
him from the suggestive power of individual dislikes and prepossessions. It will help to broaden the group to which his subconscious loyalties are due. Never will these loyalties be utterly
extinguished while human nature is what it is. We may wonder
sometimes how from the play of all these forces of individualism, there can come anything coherent, anything but chaos and
the void. Those are the moments in which we exaggerate the
elements of difference. In the end there emerges7 something
which has a composite shape and truth and order. 9
There are safeguards to prevent or correct decisions that are tainted
by bias. The first and most effective is self-regulation. If ajudge feels he
cannot objectively decide a case, he can always disqualify himself. Secondly, there is the "potent tool" of peer pressure. 80 In private, judges
are prone to argue and haggle like the advocates they once were. It is
unlikely that a decision based on bias rather than on the merits of the
case would go unnoticed and without comment by judicial brethren. Finally, there is the remedy of appellate review. "The appellate process
... is hardly a toothless animal; it is able to excise not only error but also
bias, impropriety, irrationality, and abuse of discretion." 8

D.

1

Off-The-Bench Activity: Its Definitions and Limits

While Canons 1, 2, and 3 provide the basic principles of judicial
ethics and dictate the bounds of official judicial behavior, the remainder
of the Code addresses unofficial or off-the-bench behavior. Canons 4, 5,
and 7 attempt to define and establish guidelines for the quasi-judicial,
extra-judicial, and political activities. The Code's drafters attempted to
categorize these activities for the purposes of distinct regulation. However, the lines separating the classifications quickly blur and the underlying considerations intermingle to the point of confusion, particularly in
light of the modern role of the judiciary in public policy and debate.
1. Canon Four

-

Quasi-Judicial Activities

The quasi-judicial activities provision speaks most directly to the
question of judicial expression. Standing by itself, Canon 4 seems
rather straightforward and reasonable. It provides: "A Judge May En78. Id.

79. B. CARDOZO,

THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

176 (1949).

80. See Kaufman, supra note 4, at 709 (discussing peer pressure and retirement).
81. Id. at 707.
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gage in Activities to Improve the Law, the Legal System, and the Administration of Justice. ' 8 2 In particular, as long as a judge's impartiality is
not put into question:
A. He may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in
other activities concerning the law, the legal system, and
the administration of justice.
B. He may appear at a public hearing before an executive or
legislative body or official on matters concerning the law,
the legal system, and the administration ofjustice, and he
may otherwise consult with an executive or legislative body
or official, but only on matters concerning the administration of justice.
C. He may serve as a member, officer, or director of an organization or governmental agency devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of
justice. He may assist such an organization in raising funds
and may participate in their management and investment,
but should not personally participate in public fund raising
activities. He may make recommendations to public and
private fund-granting agencies on projects and programs
concerning the83law, the legal system, and the administration of justice.
The commentary to Canon 4 states a judge is a "person specially
learned in the law" and is "encouraged" to "contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice,"
either independently or through legal organizations such as bar
84
associations.
The language of Canon 4 sets forth a broad mandate which can be
construed as sanctioning judicial comment or participation in virtually
any setting involving issues of law and policy as they bear upon the legal
system and the administration of justice. The actual interpretation of
the canon, however, has been limited because of the strong influence of
the principles of impartiality, the appearance of impropriety, and an un82. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 4.

83. Id.
84. Id. at Canon 4, Commentary. The Reporter's Notes are helpful in defining the
type of statements that are encouraged by the canon and which do not subject a judge to

charges of impropriety and, accordingly, disqualification.
The line between appropriate quasi-judicial activities and those that are likely
to lead to a judge's disqualification is not as difficult to draw as may first appear.
For example, a judge may write or lecture on a legal issue, analyzing the present
law and its history, its virtue and its shortcomings; he may commend the present
law or propose legal reform without compromising his capacity to decide impartially the very issue on which he has spoken or written. There is a significant
difference between the statement, "I will grant all divorce actions that come
before me - whatever the strength of the evidence to support the statutory
ground for divorce - because I believe that persons who no longer live in harmony should be divorced," and the statement, "I believe that limited statutory
grounds for divorce are not in the public interest. The law should be changed to
allow persons who no longer live in harmony to obtain a divorce." The latter
does not compromise a judge's capacity to apply impartially the law as written,
although it clearly states his position about improvements in the law.
E. THODE, supra note 50, at 74.
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necessarily limited vision of the judicial role and the relation of law to
public policy. For example, Canon 4(A) would seem to justify a full
range ofjudicial expression aimed at a wide variety of groups. However,
the advisory opinions which have applied the canon have constrained its
effect to more traditionally accepted forms of legal communication such
as lecturing at legal seminars, speaking to bar associations, teaching at
law schools, and writing scholarly legal articles. 8 5 Expression and activities which are not so purely legal have been put in the category of extrajudicial activities and addressed under Canon 5.86
The language of Canon 4(B) also seems to rest on a broad assumption regarding the benefits of public expression. This section, which
regulates the judicial relationship with other branches of government,
recognizes the advantages of seeking judicial insight on questions of
lawmaking 8 7 and seems to adopt a relatively modern notion8 8 that what
is said about government is best said in public. Here, the Code's limitations on private consultation with other branches to matters ofjudicial
administration 8 9 acknowledge the practicalities of governmental operation while protecting the interests of litigants and citizens in general by
requiring that judicial input into legislative policy and executive decisions be made openly where all can benefit and scrutinize. 90
85. The issue of legal teaching is addressed by three Interim Advisory Committee
opinions. See Interim Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. I (1970)(law
school teaching); Id. at Advisory Op. 6 (1970)(participating as a member of the Appellate
Judges Seminar); Id. at Advisory Op. 7 (1970)(serving as a faculty member of the National
College of State Trial Judges). Interestingly, the Interim Advisory Committee reluctantly
approved a judge's participation as a faculty member in a seminar on humanistic studies
because of the possibility that the judge's presence would encourage other persons to
participate in the event. See id. at Advisory Op. 2. Traditional forms of legal scholarship
have also been approved. However, the need for caution has been expressed where the
writings are being offered for sale or where the writings deal with decisions made by the
particular judge. See id. at Advisory Op. 8; Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory
Op. 55.
86. See infra notes 106-18 & accompanying text. The implication seems to be that the
type of judicial expression encouraged by Canon 4 has been limited to legal thoughts
presented to "right thinking" and adequately educated audiences who have been properly
sanitized and indoctrinated into the legal order. This interpretation is much narrower
than that envisioned by the drafters of the Code. As stated by Judge Irving Kaufman, a
member of the drafting committee, "The message is clear: Judges may not merely express
their views on matters within their judicial province, but have an obligation to do so in the
public interest." Kaufman, supra note 77.
87. As one commentator suggested before the drafting of the Code:
No one is better qualified to speak on law reform and questions of improvement in judicial administration than judges. Even though the efforts necessary to
accomplish significant change are often substantial, no barrier should be raised
against judicial participation in such activities beyond assurance that the obligations ofjudicial office are met. A good case could even be made for the proposition that judges have an affirmative obligation to work for improvement in judicial
administration.
McKay, supra note 42, at 21.
88. This portion of Canon 4 seems to adopt a philosophy similar to that behind open
meetings laws. See D. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAw 264-68 (3d ed. 1984).

89. While the terms "law, legal system, or the administration of justice" might be
difficult to distinguish, the Reporter's Notes to the Code suggest that the latter term is
limited to such matters as "court personnel, budget, housing, and procedures related to
the operation and administration of the courts." E. THODE, supra note 50, at 75.
90. The Advisory Committee On Judicial Activities has chosen to disregard the expan-
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Finally, Canon 4(C) provides a general authorization for judicial
participation in organizations and governmental agencies "devoted to
the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of
justice." 9 1 The provision is intended to keep "the judge in contact with
the world around him and [to make] his expertise available in the evercontinuing effort to improve the law." ' 92 Arguably, the only limitations
on the scope of this provision would be associations that would cast
doubt on a judge's impartiality because of the organization's political
stance or penchant for litigation 9 3 and membership in a governmental
body concerned with issues of fact or policy rather than with matters of
94
law.
In relation to the first of these limitations, bar association membership and leadership have been approved 95 while judicial participation on
96
legal aid boards and other advocacy organizations is not allowed.
sive potential of Canon 4, applying an unduly narrow interpretation of the provision. The
Reporter's Notes to Canon 4 clearly authorize a judge "to engage in projects directed to
the drafting of legislation." E. THODE, supra note 50, at 75. However, in its only published
opinion concerning this section, the Committee stated:
Less clear, however, is the propriety of a judge's appearing on behalf of, or
against, particular proposed legislation that relates to subject matter other than
the administration of justice. Legislation aimed at the vital policy issues of the
day, and that which embraces policy (examples: the Equal Rights Amendment,
social legislation, changes in the Internal Revenue Code), may well pose
problems for the judge despite the fact that he, too, is a citizen and, as such, may
be affected by the legislation. Such matters also may spawn litigation likely to
come before the judge. Although Canon 4 speaks of "matters concerning the
law," and although that precise phrase could be broadly construed to embrace
nearly all legislation and executive decisions, the Committee is of the view that
the reach of the Canon is not that broad and, indeed, was intended to be comparatively narrow. The Thode Notes so indicate.
The Committee, therefore, has concluded that under the Canon.... a judge
may appear before a legislative or executive body or official relative to matters
not concerning judicial administration, only when (1) the hearing is public and
(2) the subject matter reasonably may be considered to merit the attention and
comment of a judge as a judge, and not merely as an individual.
Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 50 (1977). See Reavley, supra note 6,
at 5-6, 56-57.
Interestingly, commentators have criticized Canon 4(B) as being both too narrow and
too broad. See Nathanson, Book Review, The Extra-JudicialActivities of Supreme Court Justices:
Where Should the Line be Drawn?, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 494, 521-23 (1983)(finding no distinction
between public testimony and private consultation); Dalton, supra note 65, at 1721-23
(considers matters of administration of justice to be highly subject to judicial bias not in
public interest).
91. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 4(C).
92. E. THODE, supra note 50, at 76.
93. Id.
94. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 5(G), which is the basis for this limitation, provides:
Extra-judicial Appointments. A judge should not accept appointment to a governmental committee, commission, or other position that is concerned with issues
of fact or policy on matters other than the improvement of the law, the legal
system, or the administration of justice. A judge, however, may represent his
country, state, or locality on ceremonial occasions or in connection with historical, educational, and cultural activities.
95. See Interim Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 14 (1970); Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 34 (1974). E. THODE, supra note 50, at 76.
96. Interim Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 12 (1970)(legal aid
board); Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 40 (1975)(Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith, the Sierra Club, and the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People). See infra notes 106-18 & accompanying text.
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Since both the bar association and other advocacy organizations are involved in legislative lobbying and litigation, any attempted distinction is
tenuous at best. However, the Advisory Committee has sanctioned judicial involvement in bar associations, subject to the restriction that a
judge refrain from engaging in bar activities which involve questions of
litigation. 9 7 Although there are solid arguments for limiting judicial
participation in any advocacy group, there is no reason why participation
on a legal aid board could not be similarly limited to administrative matters which do not involve questions of potential litigation. The only real
distinction, then, must be that bar associations, because of their traditional "right thinking" place in our legal heritage, have been granted
grandfather treatment in the Code.
The second restriction on judicial participation on governmental
boards that are concerned with questions of fact and policy, suffers from
a lack of vision and understanding about the interrelation of law and
policy in public decision making. First, it is not at all clear why participation in policymaking is less important or more threatening to the judicial
principles than the same sort of activities directed at legal reform. Certainly, the potential for conflicts and disqualification exists at both
levels. The Code's only justification for this limitation can be found in
the Reporter's Notes, which state "[t]he Committee adopted the view
that the time and prestige of the judiciary should not be expended on
98
the resolution of nonjudicial public issues."
Secondly, it is black letter law that under the umbrella of the due
process clause, policy decisions, such as those made by civil service or
personnel boards, 9 9 carry a force of law similar to that of legislation.' 0 0
A judge's participation in such policymaking could improve the legal
system by assisting in the creation of fair and constitutionally valid policy. Although some restriction on judicial participation in lawmaking
functions may be appropriate, the position adopted by the Code simply
fails to adequately recognize the role of law and courts in modern
society.101

In sum, Canon 4 has the potential to provide a judge with a great
deal of freedom of expression and to allow participation in advocacy
organizations. As stated in the Reporter's Notes, "a broad range of organizations and projects fall within Canon 4, corresponding to the range
of concerns that present themselves in the law under modern condi97. The spirit and intent of the [Code is] satisfied where the judge abstains from
discussion, debate and vote on matters which may present a conflict of interest or
which might give the appearance of impropriety if the judge did participate in
debate and vote.
Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 34 (1974).
98. E. THODE, supra note 50, at 91 (commenting on the Code, Canon 5(G)).

99. See Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 43 (1975) (judge prohibited from serving as a statutory member of a citizens' supervisory commission of the personnel board of the county of his residence).
100. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972).
101. See supra notes 3-30 and accompanying text.
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tions."l 0 2 Arguably, the only explicit limitation imposed on judicial expression by Canon 4 relates to private consultation as discussed in
Canon 4(B). Beyond that, the boundaries of a judge's expressional activities should be essentially self-imposed and defined by the interplay of
the basic principles ofjudicial ethics 10 3 and the scope of "quasi-judicial"
activities and "law, legal system, and the administration ofjustice"10 4 as
determined by the individual judge. As such, the field of acceptable expression should be treated as a flexible concept which can keep pace
with the ever changing and evolving role of law in public policy. In the
final analysis, a strong presumption of propriety should attach to the
views
expressional choices made by the judiciary and to their personal
10 5
regarding their duties as lawyers, jurists, and public servants.
Canon Five -

2.

Extra-Judicial Activities

Although the bulk of guidance regarding judicial expression is
found in Canon 4, it is important to examine the restrictions placed on
extra-judicial activity by Canon 5 and the restrictions placed on political
participation by Canon 7 in order to refine the central issue of this
article.
Canon 5 admonishes: "Ajudge Should Regulate His Extra-Judicial
10 6
Activities to Minimize the Risk of Conflict with His Judicial Duties."'
The drafting committee intentionally chose not to require a stricter duty
because under such a higher standard, "[t]he only way ...a judge can
avoid conflict is not to engage in extra-judicial activities.' 1 7 In addition, the Committee recognized that "[c]omplete separation of a judge
from extra-judicial activities is neither possible nor wise; he should not
become isolated from the society in which he lives."' 0 8
The implied thrust of Canon 5 is that if the questioned activity is an
extra-judicial activity, as opposed to a judicial or quasi-judicial activity, a
judge should avoid participation if the activity would raise questions regarding his impartiality or otherwise conflict with his judicial duties by
taking excessive time away from the business ofjudging.°0 Although a
102. E.
103.

THODE,

supra note 50, at 77.

See supra notes 49-81 and accompanying text.

104. E. THODE supra note 50, at 75.
105.

A full discussion of the first amendment rights of judges is beyond the scope of

this article. Even so, it is obvious that, by accepting their position, judges must give up
certain rights of expression held by the general public. See Lubet, supra note 75, at 998-99.
As a matter of wise policy, however, when considering the limitation of expressional rights
granted to a given group, we must be careful to avoid relying on the "worst case" scenario
and the perception of false conflicts. Thus, as to judicial expression, it is probably better
to err on the side of permissiveness, with comfort in the belief that what few problems

actually arise can be corrected by collateral attack and appellate review. By focusing only
on actual injuries instead of illusory slights to position and prestige, the range of judicial
thought and expression available to the public is greatly expanded and can certainly contribute to the maturation of our understanding and appreciation of law and judicial
responsibilities.
106. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 5 (emphasis added).
107.
108.

E. THOnE, supra note 50, at 78.
CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 5(A), Commentary.

109. However, as one judge has observed:
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definition of "extra-judicial activity" is not provided, the canon regulates a wide range of business and family relationships. Most importantly for the purposes at hand, Canon 5(A) provides that a judge "may
write, lecture, teach, and speak on non-legal subjects. '1 1° Unfortunately, when considered in conjunction with Canon 4, it appears that
judges are merely allowed to lecture on non-legal subjects, while they are
encouraged to lecture on legal subjects. Since the non-legal topics of history, economics, political science, sociology, and the physical sciences
are inextricably intertwined with traditional black letter law, judges
should be encouraged to lecture, teach, and speak on non-legal subjects
as well.
The limits on civic and charitable activities found in Canon 5(B),'''
on the other hand, bear some defensible relationship to the real world in
accordance with the overall purpose of Canon 5. The major focus of
Canon 5(B) is to limit judicial participation in organizations, thereby decreasing the chance that a judge will need to be disqualified from hearing a case. 1 12 For example, the Code accurately recognizes that "[t]he
changing nature of some organizations and of their relationship to the
law makes it necessary for a judge regularly to reexamine the activities of
each organization with which he is affiliated to determine if it is proper
for him to continue his relationship with it.''

3

The purpose of this

advice is to help a judge determine whether a given organization is one
that is likely to "be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come
before him or will be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any
court."'1 4 For example, it has been determined that it is inappropriate
for a judge to participate in groups such as the Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith, the Sierra Club, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 115 and Mothers Against Drunk DrivFor an appellate judge, we know exactly what it is we must do before we can
turn outside our chambers. The trial judge also knows which undecided motions
and pending decisions have priority. The backlog of untried cases is a different
matter. If a trial judge were forbidden to do anything outside the chambers until
there were no cases awaiting trial, we would never see a trial judge outside of the
chambers of courtroom. The well-being of the trial judge requires that a limit be
placed upon the number of days confinement to the courtroom itself.
Reavley, supra note 6, at 56.
110. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 5(A) (emphasis added).
111. Id. at Canon 5(B) reads in part:
Civic and Charitable Activities. A judge may participate in civic and charitable
activities that do not reflect adversely upon his impartiality or interfere with the
performance of his judicial duties. A judge may serve as an officer, director,
trustee, or non-legal advisor of an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or
civic organization not conducted for the economic or political advantage of its
members, subject to the following limitations:
(1)A judge should not serve if it is likely that the organization will be engaged in proceedings that ordinarily come before him or will be regularly
engaged in adversary proceedings in any court.
112. As stated in the Reporter's Notes to Canon 5(B), "[rlegular disqualification is too
high a price for the judicial system and the public to pay for allowing a judge to serve as an
officer or director of such an organization." E. THODE, supra note 50, at 79.
113. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 5(B)(1), Commentary.
114. Id. at Canon 5(B)(1).
115. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 40 (1975).
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ing.'16 However, within the context of Canon 5(B)(1), the degree of
participation that is considered sufficient to raise suspicion is where a
judge is identified as a leader or integral part of a given organization. In
particular, this section of the Code is "limited by its terms to service as
an officer, director, trustee or non-legal advisor."' 1 17 Thus, merely
speaking to such a group or participating in a program for the education
of its members should not be viewed as rising to the level where the
interests of the judge and the organization are seen as one." 8
3.

Canon Seven -

Political Activities

Finally, Canon 7 states: "A Judge Should Refrain from Political Activity Inappropriate to His Judicial Office."' 19 Certainly, overt political
activity is inconsistent with the basic principle of judicial independence. 120 However, politics are also inherent in government and law
and, on the practical level, difficult to separate.' 2 ' The Code seeks to
address some of these problems, but in the process raises others. As
would be expected, Canon 7 states that a judge should not "hold any
office in a political organization" or "make speeches for a political organization or candidate or publicly endorse a candidate for public office."' 122 Such activities go to the heart of partisan politics and,
accordingly, the canon's restrictions are quite reasonable.
The canon also suggests that a judge should not "attend political
gatherings."' 123 At the same time, the canon explicitly allows ajudge to
engage in "political activity . . .on behalf of measures to improve the
law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.' 124 As the Reporter's Notes explain: "[t]he Committee, recognizing that such activities are political in a broad sense, approved them because of the
important and sometimes essential role of judges in legal reform."' 1 25

As applied to judicial expression, these two provisions seem to present a
116. See Lubet, supra note 75, at 984 n.l 1,997-1007.
117. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 40 (1975).
118. It should be noted that "[a] judge may receive compensation and reimbursement
of expenses for the quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities permitted by this Code."
CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 6. However, such income should be reported as required by
the rules of the particular jurisdiction.
119. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 7.
120. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. The evils present in this type of
expression are the soiling of the judiciary's appearance as a nonpartisan body and the
potential for conflict of interest should a supported or opposed elected official later appear
in an official capacity as a party to a lawsuit. It should be noted that Canon 7 does provide
a separate set of standards for judges who are subject to partisan election or retention
election. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 7(B).
121. See Dalton, supra note 65, at 1721-22.
122. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 7(A)(1)(a)-(b). This section of the Code was the
subject of recent controversy. In April 1986, Justice O'Connor addressed 38 Republican
party donors and officers as part of a Washington tour designed to encourage party donations. It was unclear whether Justice O'Connor was aware of the group's political nature.
She subsequently withdrew from similar speaking appearances. Lowy,Justice's talk may have
violated ethics, Rocky Mtn. News, May 2, 1987, at 8, col.l.
123. Id.at Canon 7(A)(l)(c).
124. Id. at Canon 7(A)(4).
125. E. THODE, supra note 50, at 97.
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fundamental inconsistency. How can ajudge use the political process to
achieve legal reform if he cannot attend political gatherings? In order to
reconcile this conflict, it is necessary to limit the scope of the restriction
by looking to the overall purpose of Canon 7. If the purpose is to prevent both the appearance of impropriety and the erosion of judicial independence that can result from participation in party politics, then the
limitations of Canon 7 must be read to only restrict the type of attendance at political gatherings which gives the impression that the judge is
an active member of the party.1 26 As such, as long as a judge's relationship with a given political organization is solely limited to speaking to its
members about legal issues and legal reform, his attendance at the political gathering could not reasonably be seen as joining as a soldier in the
causes of the party.
IV.

GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL EXPRESSION UNDER THE CODE

In sum, a reading of the Code well within the intention of the drafters provides a great deal of freedom for judicial expression. The major
problem in determining the allowable scope of expression centers
around the organization of the Code which seeks to establish categorical
distinctions. Because of the nebulous nature of the concept of "judicial
expression," the canons tend to overlap, thereby rendering any attempt
to determine the propriety of a specific type of expression both frustrating and confusing. In such cases, the distinctions between judicial activities, quasi-judicial activities, extra-judicial activities, and political
participation become blurred and provide only limited guidance.
Therefore, this section attempts to establish guidelines for judicial expression based upon a synthesis of the Code and supporting materials.
As such, it is intended to provide direction to the judge who wishes to
contribute to society in ways which go beyond his official duties.
A.

FoundationalPrinciples

Certainly, the foundational principles ofjudicial ethics regarding independence, impartiality, and the avoidance of impropriety, must rest at
the base of every decision regarding judicial expression. These principles, however, tend to be applied in a negative manner which only discourages judicial expression. Therefore, it is important to identify other
foundational principles which weigh on the side of encouraging judicial
expression. Dean McKay has suggested that the propriety of nonjudicial
activities can be subjected to a risk/benefit analysis:
Nonjudicial activities, whether quasi-judicial or extra-judi126. Here, it is necessary to draw a distinction between politically active groups such as
the League of Women Voters and more traditional political parties. Certainly, the former
were not intended to be covered by Canon 7 since it is essentially bipartisan in nature and
dedicated to the improvement of the political system. Likewise, special interest groups,
such as the Sierra Club, should fall outside of the Canon. Their political interests are
based on achieving a particular goal and not, necessarily, on the perpetuation of a given
party.
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cial in nature, should not be allowed if there is a substantiallikelihood that the undertaking will
I. [sic] interfere with the performance of official duty;
2. interfere, or seem to interfere with the impartiality of
the participating judge; or
3. impair the dignity and prestige of the judicial office.
Where these hazards are not involved, there are reasons to permit, even to encourage, nonjudicial activities if their performance will
I. [sic] help to prevent judicial shortsightedness arising
from loss of contact with the world outside the court;
2. continue the education and development of essential
skills in law and judicial administration; or
3. enrich and educate the audiences to which the judge
lectures, writes, or teaches. 127
This formulation provides a convenient starting place for a judge seeking guidance regarding judicial expression. However, any determination regarding the existence of one of the above-enumerated risks
should be based on a finding of a real and substantial threat. The identification of such risks should be specific to the particular circumstance
and should not be relied upon as an easy way to avoid controversy or
criticism. In making this determination, a judge should be mindful that
most perceived conflicts are actually false and do not carry a real risk of
harm to the basic principles underlying the Code. Thus, a rebuttable
presumption of propriety should attach to virtually all forms ofjudicial
expression.
B.

Speaking, Writing, Lecturing, and Teaching

In light of the Code's foundational principles, a judge should be
encouraged to speak, write, lecture, and teach on any subject which
bears an arguable relationship to law, the legal system, or the administration ofjustice. In light of the interdisciplinary nature of law and the
subjects it encompasses, the above admonishment should be broadly interpreted. In addition, no distinction should be drawn as to the type of
audience a judge seeks to address, whether it be the annual convention
of the American Bar Association or the monthly meeting of the "F"
Street Garden Club.
While speaking to virtually any organization should be allowed and
encouraged, a judge must ensure that his appearance before that organization does not give the impression that he is an active member or a
soldier in its causes. This restriction is particularly important in regard
to organizations which are political in nature and seek to publicly advocate their positions. Therefore, in order to avoid the appearance ofjoining such political organizations, a judge should be allowed to participate
as a speaker but should make efforts to maintain his public appearance
of impartiality by avoiding activities such as buying tickets, paying mem127.

McKay, supra note 42, at 19-20 (emphasis added).
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bership fees, attending meetings where he is not speaking, or appearing
in pictures for publication.
Finally, the only hard and fast restriction ofjudicial expression is in
the context of proceedings before the particular judge. A judge should
limit his comments regarding pending cases to explanations of court
procedures and a careful statement of official rulings. This does not
mean that a judge may not answer public charges and criticism regarding his handling of a given matter when the fault, if any, lies with another branch of government, such as where the District Attorney refused
to prosecute or the legislature passed an obviously unconstitutional, yet
popular law. Once a matter has reached final disposition, a judge
should be free to comment on the case for the general enlightenment of
the public and to assure the participants that their arguments were
heard and justice was done.
C. Judicial Expression With Other Governmental Branches
Ajudge should be encouraged to make his experience and expertise
available to the legislative and executive branches for the improvement
of the law, the legal system, and the administration ofjustice. Except for
matters dealing with judicial administration, such contacts should be
made in a public forum because the restrictions on private consultation
in Canon 4(B) are well founded. Public trust in the belief that what a
judge has to say about government will be said in public will go far to
eliminate suspicions of private lobbying or informal advisory opinions.
D.

OrganizationalParticipation

A judge should be encouraged to participate in public or private
organizations devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system,
or the administration of justice. No distinction should be drawn as to
whether the given organization is primarily concerned with "law" or
"policy." Because public policy rests at the heart of the law and often
carries the force of law, attempts to distinguish the two concepts are
generally fruitless. In addition, considering that in our modern society a
judge is often both jurist and policymaker, his experience and insight
can be beneficial to this more expansive view of public action.
In addition, a judge should be encouraged to participate in a wide
range of civic and social organizations completely unrelated to law. People, not abstract concepts, are the subject of the law and a growing understanding of human nature will further enlighten a judge and
contribute to the fulfillment of his judicial duties. Also, a judge should
be encouraged to participate in both "legal" and "nonlegal" educational activities. As such, he should be allowed to accept scholarships
and fellowships. Certainly, he should avoid the gross use of his participation in order to further the enterprise, however, a judge's participation will certainly draw interest to an educational event. Thus, some
promotional use of his prestige cannot be avoided.
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Finally, while a judge should be encouraged to participate in organizational activities, he should avoid participating in organizations actively involved in litigation or which take public political positions which
might give the impression that the judge is contributing to those causes
as a member or a leader.
V.

CONCLUSION:

THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF JUDICIAL EXPRESSION

It clearly can be argued that, as a public servant, a judge has a duty
to help educate the public. As Judge Irving Kaufman stated: "The
message is clear: Judges may not merely express their views on matters
within theirjudicial province, but have an obligation to do so in the public interest."' 128 Generally, judges have a wealth of experience with the
law. They have the opportunity to observe its theoretical and practical
application and to analyze its strong and weak points. In addition, at
least in theory, judges are in the position to view the law from an objective and impartial point of view. Of all public officials, judges may be the
best qualified to perform the task of public education.1 29
Like most personal choices, a judge's decision regarding public judicial expression will, undoubtedly, involve a wide variety of official and
unofficial factors. However, if they are willing, judges are capable in taking the lead in the legal maturation of the public. Because of the public
respect they already hold, their participation in this educational process
has the potential to create a more enlightened public and to further the
democratic ideal of self-governance. In order to achieve these goals,
however, judges must be willing to accept a degree of criticism. They
must realize that a controversial issue will be no less controversial because they remain silent but, instead, will only be addressed at a more
emotional and superficial level because of their failure to participate and
educate. Judges must be strong and trust in the axiom that more
speech, not less, is the proper way to deal with a public controversy.
They should be willing to address groups affected by their decisions in
order to help assure the losers that their arguments were heard and that
justice was done. Although there will be many who will not react favorably to such judicial activities, the chances are that, in the long run, demonstrations of actual openness and fairness will only increase public
respect for the judiciary.

128. Kaufman, supra note 77.
129. See Rifkind, The Public Concern in aJudges Privale Life, 19 -'HE UNI'ERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL ETHICS 25, 33 (1964)(a judge can interject
rationality into, and raise the level of,an otherwise irrational public debate); Tucker, supra
note 10 (a judge's public expression can lead to a more enlightened electorate, incite more
public debate, and enhance the qiuality of future decisions): Kaufman, supra note 77 (a
judge's advice could be invaluable in the writing and passing of better laws).

